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UNITED STATES V. RUIZ: ARE 
PLEA AGREEMENTS 
CONDITIONED ON BRADY 
WAIVERS UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for a moment that you are a defense attorney, 
representing a client who has been accused of a robbery. You 
learn that the prosecution's sole witness is the victim, who 
identified your client from a line-up of individuals with a record 
of similar criminal conduct. As you expect, the prosecution 
offers your client a plea agreement. If your client pleads guilty, 
the prosecution will recommend a reduced sentence to the court 
for taking responsibility, cooperating and avoiding a time-
consuming trial. The prosecution then presents your client 
with an agreement stating that if your client waives his right 
to receive impeachment evidence, the prosecution will 
recommend a reduced sentence to the court. Fearing the 
consequences of a jury conviction and the maximum sentence 
being imposed, your client agrees to accept the plea agreement. 
You advise your client that, while the plea agreement seems 
attractive, he should not waive his right to receive 
impeachment evidence. Simultaneously and unbeknownst to 
you, the prosecution's sole witness expresses doubt regarding 
the identification of your client. The witness explains that the 
robbery took place very quickly and he was badly frightened 
and was now unsure whether he had identified the right man. 
Because a trial does not appear to be in the foreseeable future 
and a plea bargain has already been offered, the prosecutor 
withholds this information. Wanting to avoid a trial and the 
possibility of a much harsher sentence, and not realizing the 
witness' reservations, your client ignores your warning, accepts 
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the plea agreement and pleads guilty. Subsequently, you 
discover the witness' uncertainty and seek to have your client's 
guilty plea reversed. The court, however, rules that your client 
knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and agreed to waive 
his right to impeachment evidence. Thus, your client's guilty 
plea and conviction stand. l 
While the facts above are hypothetical, the situation itself 
is plausible.2 And until recently, prosecutors in both the 
Southern and Northern Districts of California systematically 
engaged in the practice of including waivers of impeachment 
evidence in plea agreements.3 Although including this waiver 
in plea agreements expedited the processing of simple cases, 
thereby alleviating the prosecution's heavy workload, the 
practice has jeopardized the truth-seeking nature upon which 
our criminal justice system is based. 
In United States u. Ruiz,4 the Ninth Circuit ruled that such 
waivers are unconstitutional, violating the principle that 
defendants in criminal cases must knowingly and voluntarily 
plead guilty for the plea to be constitutionally valid.5 The 
purpose of this article is to discuss the law leading up to the 
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Ruiz, to examine the court's ruling 
itself, and to analyze the impact this decision could have on 
plea bargaining, an integral part of the criminal justice system. 
In Part II, this Note discusses Ruizs facts and procedural 
history. Part III, section A outlines the prosecution's duty to 
disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence as set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Brady u. 
Maryland6 and its progeny. Part III, section B discusses the 
nature of guilty pleas, focusing on the several types of waivers 
that flow from such pleas. Part IV critiques the Ninth Circuit's 
ruling in Ruiz. Finally, Part V concludes that the Ninth 
Circuit properly held that plea agreements containing Brady 
waivers cannot constitutionally be entered into and that they 
1 Introduction based in part on facts taken from, Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure 
and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 957 (1989). 
2 See id. at 968-97 (discussing the possibility that without mandatory Brady 
disclosures defendants can be induced into self condemnation). 
3 Erica G. Franklin, Waiuing Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A 
Debate on the Merits of 'Viscouery" Waiuers, 51 STAN. L.REY. 567, 568-69 (1999). 
4 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001). 
6 Id. at 1165. 
6 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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obstruct the truth-seeking function of our system of criminal 
justice. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Mter Angela Ruiz was arrested for, and subsequently 
charged with, importing marijuana from Mexico to the United 
States, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern 
District of California offered her a plea agreement.7 The plea 
agreement required Ruiz to plead guilty within thirty days of 
her initial appearance, file no motions, waive her right to an 
indictment and appeal and waive her right to receive 
impeachment evidence. 8 In exchange, the Government would 
recommend a two-level downward departure to the sentencing 
judge.9 This type of agreement, known as a "fast track" plea 
agreement, was adopted to minimize the expenditure of 
Government resources and expedite the processing of more 
routine cases.lO The proverbial "carrot-on-the-stick" for 
defendants to enter the agreement was the Government's 
recommendation for a sentence reduction to the sentencing 
judge. 11 
Ruiz, however, refused to accept the "fast track" agreement 
on the basis that it contained what she believed to be an 
7 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1160. 
a Id. at 1161. The waiver in the plea agreement stated: 
WANER OF RIGHT TO BE PROVIDED 
WITH IMPEACHMENT AND 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE INFORMATION 
The Government represents that any information establishing the factual 
innocence of the defendant known to the undersigned prosecutor in this case has 
been turned over to the defendant. The Government understands it has a 
continuing duty to provide such information establishing factual innocence of the 
defendant. 
The defendant understands that if this case proceeded to trial, the Government 
would be required to provide impeachment information relating to any 
informants or other witnesses. In addition, if the defendant raised an 
affirmative defense, the Government would be required to provide information in 
its possession that supports such a defense. In return for the Government:s 
promises set forth in this agreement, the defendant waives the right to this 
information, and agrees not to attempt to withdraw the guilty plea or to me a 
collateral attack based on the existence of this information. 
Id. at 1166 (emphasis in original). 
9 Id. at 1161. 
10 Id. at 1160. 
11 Id. at 1161. 
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unconstitutional waiver of her Brady rights.12 As a result, Ruiz 
was indicted by a grand jury and arraigned.13 Two months 
after her initial appearance, Ruiz pled guilty to the charges of 
marijuana importation without the benefit of the "fast track" 
plea agreement.14Nevertheless, at her sentencing hearing Ruiz 
requested the two-level downward departure that had 
originally been offered to her as part of the "fast track" plea 
agreement. 15 This two-level downward departure would have 
brought Ruiz's sentencing range to twelve to eighteen 
months. 16 Despite refusing to sign the plea agreement and 
thereby waiving her right to impeachment evidence, Ruiz 
insisted that she had substantially complied with the 
requirements under the "fast track" program and was entitled 
to the Government's downward departure recommendation to 
the sentencing judge.17 The Government, however, opposed the 
downward departure because of Ruiz' failure to sign the plea 
agreement and to consent to the waiver of her right to receive 
impeachment evidence of government witnesses.18 
The district court denied Ruiz's request for the sentencing 
departure because the Government did not make a "fast track" 
recommendation and Ruiz had not entered into a plea 
agreement that would require such a departure from the 
regular sentencing range. 19 Ultimately, Ruiz was sentenced to 
eighteen months in jai1.20 Ruiz appealed her sentence to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.21 
12 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1161. According to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and 
its progeny, prosecutors have a duty to disclose "favorable evidence to an accused" if 
the evidence is "material either to guilt or punishment." Id. at 87. This disclosure 
requirement applies to impeachment evidence as well. Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154 (1985). While Ruiz argued the waiver was unconstitutional, the dissent 
pointed out that no evidence showed that she initially refused to sign the "fast track" 
plea agreement on that premise. Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1171. The lower court had made no 
factual finding on the matter. Id. at 1168. 
13 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1171. After the arraignment, Ruiz's appearance bond was 
revoked and she was remanded into custody for testing positive for cocaine and PCP. 
Id. 
14 Id. at 1161 
15 Id. 
16 Id. Without the benefit of the "fast track" plea agreement Ruiz was facing a 
sentencing range from 18 to 24 months. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit granted review of this case for the 
purpose of deciding two issues: 1) whether the right to Brady 
information can constitutionally be waived as a condition to 
receiving the benefits of a plea bargain; and 2) whether the 
Government can constitutionally withhold recommendations 
for sentencing departures based on a defendant's refusal to 
waive her right to Brady materia1.22 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE BRADY RULE 
In Brady v. Maryland23 the United States Supreme Court 
held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment 
••• ".24 In reaching its holding, the Court relied on Mooney v. 
Holohan25 and Pyle v. Kansas26 and extended the somewhat 
narrower principles articulated in those cases to create what 
has become known as the Brady rule.27 In Mooney, the Court 
ruled that the knowing use of perjured testimony by the 
prosecution to secure a conviction was "inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of justice" and as such was a violation of 
due process.28 The Court's holding in Mooney was later 
broadened in Pyle.29 In that case, the Court reaffirmed 
Mooney s holding and extended the scope of due process 
violations to encompass the deliberate suppression of evidence 
favorable to the accused by state authorities.30 
22 Id. 
23 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
24 Id. at 87. In Brady, the Court overruled John Brady's death sentence because 
the prosecution failed to produce evidence of the actual killer's confession that had 
been requested by Brady's lawyer. Id. at 86. 
25 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
26 317 U.S. 213 (1942). 
27 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86·88. 
28 Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112. 
29 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87. 
30 Pyle, 317 U.S. at 215-16. In Brady, the Court adopted the Third Circuit's 
interpretation of the statement in Pyle to mean that "the suppression of evidence 
favorable to the accused was itself sufficient to amount to a denial of due process. 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Court further relied on its holding in Napue v. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264 (1959) that a due process violation occurs "when the state, although not 
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Brady, 373 U.S. 
5
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The Brady Court's holding was an extension from 
prohibiting the knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain a 
conviction, into a constitutional rule of discovery prohibiting 
the Government's failure to supply exculpatory information to 
the defendant upon request. 31 The Brady Court set up three 
requirements for a defendant to challenge the validity of his 
conviction based on the Government's suppression of 
evidence.32 First, the defendant had to show that the evidence 
the Government withheld was favorable. 33 Second, the 





either to the determination of guilt or 
Finally, the defendant had to request 
the exculpatory information from the 
Not only did Brady require that the accused prove these 
elements, the wording of Brady lent itself to the interpretation 
that the Government had to be aware of the exculpatory 
evidence for a duty to disclose the evidence to be triggered.36 
Since Brady, however, courts have increased the amount of 
information presumed to be within the prosecutions knowledge 
to all information gathered in connection with its office's 
investigation of a specific case.37 Thus, while the prosecution 
has no duty to disclose exculpatory information of which it is 
not aware, the prosecution cannot avoid its disclosure 
obligation by keeping itself ignorant of evidence that the 
investigation has produced.3s 
at 87. 
31 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86·88. 
32 Id. at 87. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. This request requirement was subsequently dropped in United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), which held that, "if the [Brady) evidence is so clearly 
supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to 
produce, that duty should equally arise even if no request is made." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 
107. 
36 See generally Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995). In Sanchez, 
the Ninth Circuit interpreted Brady as requiring an awareness element by the 
Government. Id. at 1453. 
37 21A AM. JUR. 2d § 1271 (1998). 
38 Id. 
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1. Ethical Duty to Disclose 
In light of the deception engaged in by the prosecution in 
the cases leading up to and including Brady, the United States 
Supreme Court justified the rule set forth in Brady on the 
ground that the federal government has a duty to seek justice 
above all else.39 Society, the Court declared, benefitted not only 
from the conviction of its criminals, but also from the public 
belief in the fairness of that process.40 And for true justice to 
be achieved, prosecutors must act in a fair manner.41 
Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct42 
echoes the Brady rule and its idealism.43 In fact, Rule 3.8 is 
more demanding than the Brady rule, requiring the disclosure 
of not only exculpatory evidence, but evidence that mitigates 
the offense charged to the defendant.44 Not surprisingly, the 
comment to Rule 3.8 also reflects the Court's sentiment in 
Brady that "a prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of 
justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility 
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is 
accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the 
basis of sufficient evidence."45 
Despite the obvious ethical grounds underlying the Brady 
rule, however, the Court in United States v. Agurs46 announced 
that the prosecutor's constitutional obligation ~o disclose Brady 
39 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88. 
40 [d. at 87. 
4\ [d. at 87-88. 
42 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8 (1999). Rule 3.8 reads in 
pertinent part: 
[d. 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to 
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the 
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except 




45 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, RULE 3.8 cmt. (1999). See also Lisa 
M. Kurcias, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1205, 1213 (2000) (concluding that "the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable 
to the defense is an inherent and important part of a prosecutor's ethical 
responsibilities. "). 
46 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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material is not measured by his "moral culpability or 
willfulness. "47 Rather, the Court held, "[i]f the suppression of 
evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the 
character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor."48 
Still, in Agurs, the Court concluded that the prosecutor's role 
as the seeker of justice "illuminates the standard of materiality 
that governs his obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence."49 
The Court's best expression regarding the purpose 
underlying the Brady rule, however, may be in United States v. 
Bagley.50 There, the Court stated that "[t]he Brady rule is 
based on the requirement of Due Process. Its purpose is not to 
displace the adversary system as the primary means by which 
truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice 
does not occur."51 
2. Brady B Requirements 
a. Time of Disclosure 
Generally, the Government's duty to disclose Brady 
material is ongoing. 52 Thus, even when information becomes 
available at trial, the Government has a duty to inform the 
defendant. 53 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
gone so far as to hold that, "[t]he government's obligation to 
make such disclosures is pertinent not only to an accused's 
preparation for trial but also to his determination of whether or 
not to plead guilty."54 Under this rationale, the time required 
for the disclosure of Brady material by the prosecution would 
have to be as early as possible, not just before trial, so as to 
provide a defendant with the capability to enter the most 
informed plea possible. 55 Regardless of when the prosecutor is 
required to disclose Brady evidence, the Court, since its 
47 [d. at 110. 
48 [d. 
49 [d. at 11I. 
50 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
51 [d. at 675. 
52 21A AM. JUR. 2d §1271 (1998). 
53 [d. 
54 United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998). 
55 [d. 
8
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decision in Brady, has eliminated the requirement that the 
accused must first request the information. 56 
b. Evidence Must Be Favorable to the Defendant 
In Brady, the Government suppressed evidence of a 
confession by Brady's co-defendant that he, rather than Brady, 
actually committed the murder. 57 While not exactly 
exculpatory, the evidence was important to show the jury that 
Brady had only helped to plan the murder, rather than actually 
committing the murder. 58 The Court found this evidence to be 
important enough to require the reversal of Brady's death 
sentence because the jury had the option of sentencing Brady 
to life imprisonment rather than death.59 Had the jury heard 
evidence of the co-defendant's confession, the jury could have 
imposed a different sentence.60 Thus, the evidence was deemed 
to be favorable to Brady despite the fact that it was not 
completelyexculpatory.61 
In Giglio v. United States,62 the Court expanded the scope 
of favorable evidence to include both evidence that was at some 
level exculpatory and impeachment evidence of a Government 
witness or evidence that showed bias or prejudice.63 In Bagley 
the Court affirmed its holding in Giglio, adding that 
impeachment evidence was favorable to the accused because if 
"disclosed and used effectively, it [could] make the difference 
between conviction and acquittal."64 
This is not to say that the Brady rule requires the 
disclosure of all of the prosecution's material for the benefit of 
56 Agurs, 427 u.s. at 107. See also supra text accompanying note 35. 
57 Brady, 373 U.S. at 84-85 (1969). Brady had requested evidence of several 
statements made by his co-defendant. [d. While the Government turned over several 
of those statements, the confession was not turned over to Brady until after the trial, 
appeal, and the affirmation of Brady's guilt by the appellate court. [d. at 83. 
58 [d. at 84-85. 
59 [d. 
60 [d. at 83. 
6t Brady, 373 U.S. at 88-89. 
62 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
63 [d. at 154. 
64 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675. The impeachment evidence in Bagley and Giglio was 
evidence that the Government would promise not to prosecute the key witness in 
return for his testimony on behalf of the Government. See generally Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
9
Cahill: Brady Waivers in Plea Agreements
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
10 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 32:1 
the defense.65 As the Bagley Court held, "the prosecutor is not 
required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to 
disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, 
would deprive the defendant of a fair trial ... ".66 Thus, while it 
is clear that the government must disclose exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence to the defendant, it is not required to 
"divulge every scintilla of evidence that might conceivably 
inure to the defendant's benefit ... ".67 
c. The Materiality Standard and Guilty Pleas 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a finding 
of materiality is proper if an evaluation of the Brady evidence 
would lead the court to conclude that in any reasonable 
likelihood the evidence would have affected the judgment of the 
jury.68 As the Fifth Circuit stated, in Matthew v. Johnson,69 
this standard of materiality indicates that the Brady rule was 
meant to apply exclusively to exculpatory evidence withheld 
during a trial, and not during the entry of a guilty plea.70 In 
Matthew, the defendant sought to have a plea of nolo 
contendere for aggravated sexual assault of a minor set aside 
after discovering that the assistant district attorney had 
withheld documents in which the victim had at one point told 
Child Protective Services that Matthew had not abused her.71 
On appeal the Fifth Circuit refused to recognize the 
prosecutor's failure to disclose this information as a 
Brady violation. 72 
65 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675. 
66 Id. 
67 21A AM JUR 2d § 1271 (West 1998). 
68 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (citing Giglio v United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972». 
69 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000). 
70 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361-62. 
71 Id. at 356-57. Before reaching the Fifth Circuit on appeal, the focus in the trial 
court was whether Matthew had waived his right to assert a Brady claim after 
pleading no contest. Id. at 356-68. Initially, the magistrate judge held that Matthew 
had not waived his right to raise a Brady claim and "reasoned that the allegation that 
the prosecution had withheld evidence, if true, would affect 'the very integrity of the 
plea process.'" Id. at 356. Mter conducting an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate 
applied the Sanchez standard of materiality and found that had Matthew possessed the 
Brady evidence, he would not have pled no contest and would have insisted on going to 
trial. Id. at 357. The magistrate's decision to vacate the plea, however, was 
subsequently reversed on appeal to the district court, which found that Matthew had 
"waived" his right to raise a Brady claim upon pleading no contest. Id. at 358. 
72 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 360-64. 
10
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To support the conclusion that Brady was only meant to be 
applied in the context of a trial, the Fifth Circuit focused on the 
Brady rule's materiality standard.73 The court noted several 
United States Supreme Court decisions in which the 
materiality standard had been framed in the context of trials.74 
In one such opinion, the court observed that the United States 
Supreme Court had explicitly rejected U[a]n earlier argument 
that the materiality test should be defined in terms of the 
defendant's ability to prepare for trial ... ".75 Given the deeply 
intertwined nature of the Brady rule with trials, the Fifth 
Circuit held that no constitutional violation could occur where 
there was no trial. 76 Thus, because Matthew had pled no 
contest, waiving his right to a trial, the prosecutor had no duty 
to disclose Brady evidence and no due process violation had 
occurred.77 
Despite Matthew, however, some courts and Justices have 
phrased the materiality standard broad enough to countenance 
non-trial situations, including Brady claims that involve a 
guilty plea.78 For example, in Justice Blackmun's opinion in 
73 [d. at 361. 
74 [d. To support its position, the Fifth Circuit pointed to the United States 
Supreme Court's decisions in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (discussing 
the invalidity of convictions obtained at trial through deceptive means); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87·88 (1963) (discussing a prosecutor's duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence at trial); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) and 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (discussing disclosure of impeachment 
evidence of government witnesses during trial); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
112 n.20 (1976) (rejecting as over broad a disclosure requirement that would 
encompass pre-trial situations); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (framing the 
Brady materiality requirement in the context of trials). [d. 
75 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361. The portion of Agurs to which the Fifth Circuit 
referred stated that: "It has been argued that the [materiality] standard should focus 
on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial, 
rather than the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence. Such a 
standard would be unacceptable ... [in part, because it] would necessarily encompass 
incriminating evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, since knowledge of the 
prosecutor's entire case would always be useful in planning the defense." Agurs, 427 
U.S. at 112 n.20 (internal citations omitted); Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361. 
76 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361. 
77 [d. at 361-362. 
78 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J). It should be noted that a 
significant debate has developed as to whether or not Brady s materiality requirement 
makes the rule inherently inapplicable to plea bargaining and pre-plea discovery. See 
e.g., John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001) (modification of the traditional materiality 
requirement is necessary to apply Brady to plea bargaining); Daniel P. Blank, Plea 
Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and 
11
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Bagley, he announced a liberal materiality standard, stating 
that "evidence is material . . . if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different."79 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices White and Rehnquist supported Justice Blackmun's 
standard of materiality stating that, Justice Blackmun's 
standard of materiality "is 'sufficiently flexible' to cover all 
instances of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable 
to the accused. "80 This standard seemed to gain yet more 
support by Justice Souter in Kyles v. Whitley81 and Justice 
Stevens in Strickler v. Greene.82 While Justice Stevens in 
Strickler stated that for practical purposes, "there is never a 
real 'Brady violation' unless the non-disclosure was so serious 
that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed 
evidence would have produced a different verdict," he also 
stated that the term "Brady violation" has at times been used 
to refer to "any breach of the broad obligation to disclose 
exculpatoryevidence."83 
Applying this broad standard to plea bargaining, the test 
in a Brady claim arising out of a guilty plea would then be 
whether the defendant would have pled differently had the 
Brady information been available.84 This was the standard 
Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L.REV. 2011 (2000) (Brady rule can apply to plea bargaining); 
Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HAsTINGS 
L.J. 957 (1989) (same); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(accused can raise a post-plea Brady claim); Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 360 
(2000) (accused cannot raise a post-plea Brady claim). See also supra note 67. 
79 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added). 
80 Id. at 685. 
81 514 U.S. 419, 437-40 (1995). After quoting the STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-3.11(a)(1993) and MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8, Justice Souter stated that prosecutors alone can 
know when evidence rises to the level requiring disclosure under Brady and thus bear 
the burden of timely disclosure. Id. at 437-38. Recognizing that Brady and its progeny 
impose a certain amount of leeway, and thus uncertainty, on when prosecutors must 
act, Justice Souter concluded that prosecutors "anxious about tacking too close to the 
wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence." Id. at 439 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 
108 ("[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."». 
82 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999). 
83 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added). 
84 John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001) stating that "If we apply the Brady-Bagley 
standard literally to that proceeding and that result, the information is material if 
there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed, the court would not have 
accepted the plea." Id. at 473. This, however, Douglass asserts would create a 
12
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applied by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez u. United States. 85 In 
Sanchez, the defendant sought to vacate his guilty plea for 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to 
distribute after discovering that the party who supplied the 
drugs and convinced him to plead guilty had been a sheriffs 
informant. 86 Mter finding that Sanchez had not forfeited his 
right to raise a Brady claim by pleading guilty, the court 
focused on Brady s materiality standard.87 
While the Sanchez court recognized that the "usual" 
standard of materiality focuses on Brady challenges in the 
context of a trial, the court held that in cases in which the 
defendant has pled guilty and then raises a Brady claim, the 
standard is "whether there is a reasonable probability that but 
for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant 
would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial."88 In 
further defining this standard, the court stressed that 
Sanchez's simple assertion that he would have chosen to go to 
trial had he been in possession of the undisclosed 
Brady information, was inadequate.89 Rather, the court held 
that "the test for whether the defendant would have chosen to 
go to trial is an objective one that centers on 'the likely 
persuasiveness of the withheld information.'''90 Applying this 
standard, the court found that it would not have been 
objectively reasonable, given the lack of favorable evidence, for 
Sanchez to go to trial and assert an entrapment defense 
against the government.91 
"meaningless circle" as courts defined materiality in terms of whether the plea was 
voluntarily and intelligent and would not accept a plea as voluntary and intelligent if 
any material evidence was excluded. [d. Douglass points out that this could be 
avoided, however, by shifting the courts focus so that "instead of assessing materiality 
in relation to the adjudicated 'outcome' of the guilty plea 'proceeding'- that is the 
courts acceptance of the plea - courts have shifted the focus to defendants' tactical 
decision to plead guilty." Id. at 474-75. 
85 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995). 
86 [d. at 1450-51. Apparently the informant told Sanchez that if he pled guilty, the 
informant would be able to insure that Sanchez's wife would not be prosecuted and he 
would help Sanchez escape from prison. [d. 
87 [d. at 1453-54. See also infra text accompanying note 139 for the forfeiture 
discussion in Sanchez. 
88 50 F.3d at 1454. 
89 [d. 
90 [d. (quoting Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1322 (2d Cir. 1988». 
91 50 F.3d at 1454. As is apparent, the circuit courts are sharply divided on what 
standard to apply, as well as the equally significant issue of whether or not the Brady 
rule is applicable to plea bargaining. See also supra note 78. 
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B. GUILTY PLEAS 
The guilty plea has become the most routine method by 
which a criminal defendant is convicted in the American justice 
system.92 In fact, nearly ninety percent of all federal and state 
convictions are the result of a guilty plea, usually involving 
some form of plea agreement.93 Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that, "[t]he state to some 
degree encourages pleas of guilty at every important step in the 
criminal process."94 There are several reasons why a defendant 
may plead guilty, including: the defendant's respect for the 
law; apprehension of the charge; threats made by the 
government; accumulation of evidence against the defendant; 
limiting liability to which the defendant himself is exposed; or 
reducing the financial and emotional burden facing the 
defendant or his family.95 
Regardless of a defendant's motivation to plead guilty, "[a] 
guilty plea is more than a confession which admits that the 
accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing 
remains but to give judgment and determine punishment."96 A 
guilty plea "serves as a stipulation that no proof by the 
prosecution need be advanced . . .. It supplies both evidence 
and verdict, ending controversy."97 Because of the influence 
the guilty plea has upon our criminal justice system, great 
precautions are taken to ensure that a defendant's conviction 
pursuant to a guilty plea is obtained in a constitutionally sound 
manner.98 Thus, strict requirements have been established to 
ensure that a defendant's guilty plea is entered both 
voluntarily and intelligently.99 
92 u.s. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2001); 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, page 454. 
93 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2001). 
94 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). In Brady, the defendant on the 
advice of counsel pleaded guilty to first degree murder later challenging the jury 
selection as race-based. Id. at 743-44. This case should not to be confused with Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which announces the rule that exculpatory 
information must be disclosed by the prosecution. Id. at 87. 
95 Brady, 397 U.S. at 750. See also Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy 
in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989) (proposing the possibility that 
defendants enter into guilty pleas after inaccurately assessing the facts against them). 
96 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
97 Id. at 242-43 nA. 
98 Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-53. 
99 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
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1. Voluntary & Intelligent; Requirements of a Valid Guilty Plea 
Among the mostly deeply rooted principles concerning 
guilty pleas is that a defendant's guilty plea will only be 
considered constitutionally valid when it is entered into 
voluntarily and intelligently to the satisfaction of the court.100 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure101 explicitly 
states that before the district court may accept a guilty plea, it 
must first determine that the plea is voluntary.102 Rule 11 
requires the court to address the defendant personally, rather 
than through his lawyer, and to ensure the guilty plea is made 
voluntarily, not under force or duress. 103 As part of this inquiry, 
the court must inform the defendant of the rights he is waiving, 
100 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (Defendant's conviction, by 
way of guilty plea, for wilfully and knowingly evading tax payments was set aside on 
the grounds that the district judge failed to determine directly from the defendant 
himself whether the plea he was entering was voluntary and knowing). 
101 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 states in pertinent part: 
(c) Before accepting a guilty plea . . . the court must address the defendant 
personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the 
defendant understands, the following: 
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum 
penalty provided by law ... and the mandatory maximum possible penalty 
provided by law including the effect of any special parole or supervised release 
term, the fact that the court is required to consider any applicable sentencing 
guidelines but may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances, and, 
when applicable, that the court may also order the defendant to make restitution 
to any victim of the offense; and 
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that the defendant has the 
right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and, if 
necessary, one will be appointed to represent the defendant; and 
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if 
it has already been and, the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial the right 
to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, and the right against compelled self-incrimination; and 
(4) that if a guilty plea ... is accepted by the court there will not be a further trial 
or any kind, so that by pleading guilty ... the defendant waives his right to a 
trial ... 
(d) The court shall not accept a guilty plea ... without first, by addressing the 
defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and 
not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The 
court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty . 
. . results from prior discussions between the attorney for the government and 
the defendant or the defendant's attorney. 
(f) Notwithstanding the acceptance of a guilty plea, the court should not enter a 
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that 
there is a factual basis for the plea. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
102 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
103 [d. 
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the rights he retains and the charges and possible 
consequences he faces by pleading guilty. 104 
In McCarthy v. United States,105 the United States 
Supreme Court labored to ensure that Rule 11 was understood 
and properly followed by the federal courts.l06 In McCarthy, 
after the district court judge briefly inquired of the defendant's 
lawyer as to whether the defendant's plea was voluntary, the 
court accepted the defendant's guilty plea to tax evasion. l07 
During the sentencing, however, the defendant stated his 
failure to file was "not deliberate," thus negating one of the 
elements of the charge. lOB Subsequently, the defendant sought 
to have his guilty plea withdrawn on the basis that the district 
court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 11.109 
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court found 
that the first error occurred when the district court failed to 
address the defendant directly. 110 This is an important 
requirement which enables the judge to get a better sense of 
the defendant's actual willingness to enter the plea, in essence 
exposing his state of mind and ensuring the creation of a more 
complete record in the event the district court's determination 
is subsequently attacked.l l1 In addition to ensuring a 
voluntary plea in the sense that it is not coerced, the Court 
held that the district court must also ensure that the defendant 
"possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the 
facts."112 Thus, the district court must satisfactorily conclude 
that the defendant is admitting to conduct which also 
comprises the elements of the crime to which he is pleading 
guilty. 113 Because the district court failed to inquire of the 
defendant regarding the facts of the offense to which he was 
admitting, the Court reversed the conviction.114 
104 Id. 
105 394 U.S. 459 (1969). 
106 Id. at 463. 
107 Id. at 461. 
108 Id.at 461-62. 
109 Id. at 462-63. 
110 Id. at 459. 
111 McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467. 
112 Id. at 466. 
113 Id. at 467. 
114 Id. at 471-72. 
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2. Waivers, Guilty Pleas, and the Loss of Rights. 
Generally, a guilty plea necessarily involves the waiver of 
several important constitutional rights. 115 In addition, by 
entering a guilty plea, a defendant also forfeits the right to 
raise a broad range of legal and constitutional claims on 
appeal. 116 For those rights which are not necessarily waived or 
forfeited as the result of a guilty plea, a defendant may be able 
to expressly waive others during a plea agreement in order to 
obtain a more favorable sentence.117 While most rights are or 
can be waived during the course of a guilty plea or plea 
agreement,118 some rights cannot be waived at all, either by 
pleading guilty or by agreeing to do so in a plea agreement,119 
As can be seen from the several types of waivers that exist, 
one commentator has noted that such a broad use of the word 
"waiver" has led to considerable confusion as to what exactly 
constitutes a waiver.120 Rather than trying to lump "waivers" 
into one category in which they do not all fit, Assistant Federal 
Public Defender, Daniel Blank, has suggested that there are 
116 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (stating that " [sJeveral 
constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a guilty plea is 
entered .... First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination .... Second, 
is the right to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers.") (internal 
citations omitted». 
116 See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989). See also Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267-69 (1973). 
117 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164. See also United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 
(9th Cir. 1996) (defendants may generally agree to waive the right to appeal their 
sentence); and Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 397 (1987) (defendants may agree to 
waive the right to file a civil suit under 43 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking redress for 
government violations of constitutional rights). 
118 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995) (holding that there is a 
·presumption that legal rights generally . . . are subject to waiver by voluntary 
agreement of the parties"). 
119 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (holding that "[tJhere may be some evidentiary 
provisions that are so fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that they 
may never be waived without irrparably 'discredit[ingJ the federal courts'"). See 
generally Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988) (a defendant may not waive 
his right to conflict free counsel); United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that a plea agreement cannot bar defendants from asserting "claims 
involving a breach of the plea agreement, racial disparity in sentencing among 
codefendants or an illegal sentence impose in excess of a maximum statutory penalty"); 
United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1992) (in which the court held the right 
to a unanimous jury verdict can never be waived); United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 
1263 (9th Cir. 1997) (which provides for an unwaivable right to a speedy trial). 
120 Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist s Guide 
to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2048 (2000). 
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several types of waivers that must be evaluated before a court 
can decide how a defendant's rights are or have been 
extinguished. 121 It is sufficient here to recognize that when a 
defendant pleads guilty: 1) most of his rights are either 
automatically lost or forfeited; 2) some are withheld and may 
bargain away at the defendant's discretion; and 3) a select few 
are unwaivable.122 
a. Automatic Waiver of Rights after a Guilty Plea 
One of the most significant and immediate consequences a 
guilty plea imposes on the defendant who decides to admit to 
guilt is the defendant's automatic loss of several constitutional 
protections. 123 Mter a defendant admits in court that he as 
committed a crime, not only is he subject to an inevitable 
determination of punishment, but he also loses his right to 
invoke the privilege against self· incrimination, request a jury 
trial, or confront his accusers.124 Because of the dire 
consequences and generally irreversible nature of a guilty plea, 
courts must diligently ensure that the defendant understands 
he is waiving these rights before accepting the guilty plea.125 
Failure to do so may otherwise result in an unconstitutional 
and thus void plea.126 
b. Forfeiture of Rights 
Not significantly different from automatic waivers, is a 
defendant's loss of rights by forfeiture. 127 This type of waiver is 
embodied by the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
121 [d. at 2049-50. These types of waivers include: 1) the intentional relinquishment 
of known rights; 2) the forfeiture of rights; 3) the loss of rights through the process of 
election; and 4) the attempt to waive rights that are inalienable. [d. 
122 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1163-64. 
123 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). 
124 [d. at 243. 
125 [d. 
126 [d. at 243-44. 
127 See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). See also Robert K. Calhoun, 
Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 127, 131 (1995) ("in a series of 
United States Supreme Court cases beginning with the Brady trilogy, and culminating 
in Tollett v. Henderson, the Court has held that, by entering a guilty plea, a defendant 
forfeits a broad range of potential legal and constitutional appellate claims that' would 
otherwise have been available had the case gone to triaL"). 
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Tollett v. Henderson. 128 In Tollett, after pleading guilty to 
murder, the defendant discovered that blacks had been 
unconstitutionally excluded during the grand jury selection 
and sought to have his guilty plea withdrawn on the basis that 
his Fourteenth Amendment right to have a grand jury selected 
in accordance with the constitution had been violated.129 
Since a waiver in the traditional sense required an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right, the Court held 
that the defendant could not have "waived" his right to 
challenge the constitutionality of the grand jury because he 
was unaware that such discrimination was occurring at the 
time the grand jury was selected.130 Nonetheless, the right had 
been forfeited. 131 Following a line of cases which have 
popularly become known as the Brady trilogy,132 the Court held 
that: 
a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which 
has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal 
defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in 
fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not 
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the 
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the 
entry of the guilty plea. 133 
Thus, while the defendant had not waived his right to 
challenge the constitutionality of the grand jury selection upon 
pleading guilty, the Court found that because of the guilty plea, 
the claim was lost, or forfeited. 134 In United States v. Broce, 135 
the Court echoed its holding in Tollett and upheld the 
defendants' guilty pleas despite their challenges that the 
128 411 U.S. 258 (1973). 
129 [d. at 259·60. 
130 [d. at 266. 
131 [d. 
132 This Brady should not be confused with Brady v. Maryland in which the Brady 
rule was set forth. The Brady Trilogy consists of: Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 
U.S. 790 (1970). 
133 Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. 
134 [d. See also Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 131 n.18 (1995) ("the operative effect of Tollett and its progeny [is] the 
'forfeiture' of appeal rights."). 
135 488 U.S. 563 (1989). 
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principle of double jeopardy had been violated.136 In Broce, the 
Court held that a "conscious waiver is [not] necessary with 
respect to each potential defense relinquished by a guilty plea," 
instead, "[r]elinquishment derives ... from the admissions 
necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary guilty plea."137 
Simply put, the Court stated that "[r]espondents had the 
opportunity, instead of entering their guilty pleas, to challenge 
the theory of the indictments ... in a trial-type proceeding. They 
chose not to, and hence relinquished that entitlement."138 
While Tollett and its progeny generally bar defendants 
from raising antecedent constitutional claims, this rule is not 
absolute. 139 The Ninth Circuit, is among the several circuits 
that have carved out an exception to the Tollett rule. 140 
Generally, this exception allows defendants to raise 
constitutional challenges to alleged violations that precede 
guilty pleas if the defendants entered these pleas without the 
136 Id. at 565. 
137 Id. at 573-74. 
138 Id. at 571. This is the position the Eighth Circuit has taken on post-plea Brady 
claims. In Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1989), the court summarily 
held that a defendant, upon pleading guilty, waives any claim against the Government 
for failure to disclose favorable Brady evidence. Id. at 657. From the Eight Circuit's 
brief opinion, it appears that the court deemed the defendant to have forfeited his 
claim against the Government for withholding Brady evidence based on the same 
principles in Tollett, that a defendant is deemed to forfeit his right to raise an 
antecedent constitutional claim after pleading guilty. See id. 
139 See e.g. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 31 (1974) (holding that a violation of the 
right not to be haled into court at all to answer a felony charge is not a claim of an 
"antecedent constitutional violation" or a "deprivation of constitutional rights that 
occurred prior to the entry of a guilty plea" that is barred by Tollett); Menna v. New 
York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (holding that a double jeopardy claim was not waived 
"where the state is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a 
defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge 
be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty."). 
140 See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995). See also White 
v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that the Tollett line of cases 
does not preclude a collateral attack upon a guilty plea based on a claimed Brady 
violation.); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a guilty 
plea entered absent Brady material is subject to collateral attack because it cannot be 
intelligently and voluntarily entered); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 321 (6th 
Cir. 1985) (stating that the Supreme Court in Tollett and the Brady trilogy did not 
intend to insulate all misconduct of constitutional proportions from judicial scrutiny 
solely because that misconduct was followed by a plea which otherwise passes 
constitutional muster as knowing and intelligent."); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 
491, 495-96 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that under certain limited circumstances, a 
Brady violation can render a defendant's plea involuntary, thus a defendant who has 
pleaded guilty is not automatically barred from claiming later that the prosecution 
withheld material evidence). 
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necessary disclosure of Brady evidence by the prosecution. 141 
The Ninth Circuit adopted this exception in Sanchez v. United 
States, in which the defendant sought to vacate his guilty plea 
after learning that the Government allegedly suppressed 
impeachment evidence.l42 The court reasoned that this 
exception was warranted because defendants, without having 
access to exculpatory Brady evidence, could not appropriately 
assess the prosecution's case.l43 Thus, they could not enter 
constitutionally sound voluntary and intelligent guilty pleas.144 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that Sanchez could not 
have waived his right to raise a Brady claim after pleading 
guilty because "[a] waiver cannot be deemed 'intelligent and 
voluntary' if 'entered without knowledge of material 
information withheld by the prosecution."'145 Ultimately the 
driving force behind the adoption of this exception was the 
courts concern that if defendants were barred from raising 
Brady claims after pleading guilty, "prosecutors may be 
tempted to deliberately withhold exculpatory information as 
part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas."146 
141 See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453. 
142 See id. Specifically, Sanchez alleged that the Government failed to disclose the 
fact that two "friends" that had visited Sanchez in jail and counseled him to plead 
guilty were also Government informants. Id. at 1450. Apparently these informants 
(whom Sanchez believed to be his friends) told Sanchez that if he pled guilty they 
would be able to secure his release through contacts they had in Washington D.C. and 
that his wife would not be indicted. Id. at 1451. See also supra text accompanying 
note 85 for a discussion of Brady's materiality standard as applied by the Ninth Circuit 
in Sanchez. 
143 Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. (quoting Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988». 
146 Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453. The Fifth Circuit has taken a different view of this 
issue, however. In Matthew u. Johnson, the court concluded that when a defendant 
enters guilty plea, it is not involuntary or unintelligent if the prosecutor withholds 
material Brady evidence because courts do not need this information to accept a guilty 
plea. 201 F.3d at 364·69. Further, the court categorized as "weak" the argument that, 
because defendant's often rely on an assessment of the prosecutions case in pleading 
guilty, voluntary and intelligent plea cannot be entered absent Brady material. Id. at 
368·69. The court stated that defendants often enter guilty pleas with incomplete or 
inaccurate information and even with exculpatory Brady material, the defendant 
would still only be provided with "part of the picture"; in reality, the court stated, the 
defendant would need both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence to be able to enter a 
plea voluntarily and intelligently under this reasoning. Id. However, the United 
States Supreme court' has held that such disclosure is not required. United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire 
file to defense counsel. .. ."). 
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c. Voluntary and Intentional Waiver of Rights Mter Pleading 
Guilty 
Despite the fact that a guilty plea operates as an automatic 
waiver of the three rights enumerated in Boykin and the 
forfeiture of a wide-range of other constitutional rights, a 
defendant who enters a guilty plea is not totally without 
rights. 147 It is not uncommon for the government to bargain for 
the waiver of these retained rights.148 When it does so the 
defendant is being asked to make the type of waiver 
contemplated by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst. 149 These 
waivers involve the "intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege" by the 
defendant.15o As to these waivers, the United States Supreme 
Court has consistently held that "[a] criminal defendant may 
knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most 
fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution."151 In 
addition, unless otherwise proscribed by a showing of 
congressional intent, a defendant may also waive many 
statutory protections.152 
For example, in United States v. Mezzanatto,153 the United 
States Supreme Court held very broadly in favor of allowing a 
defendant the ability to waive normally protected rights in 
exchange for leverage with the prosecutor. 1M In Mezzanatto, 
the defendant approached the prosecution hoping to cooperate 
after being arrested for possession with intent to distribute 
147 Interview with Robert K. Calhoun, Professor, Golden Gate University School of 
Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (November 12, 2001). See also supra text accompanying 
note 124. 
148 Id. See also Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal 
Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L.REV. 2011, 
2057 (2000) (stating that "[mlany criminal waivers, particularly but not exclusively 
those associated with plea bargains, occur during a negotiation with the government."). 
149 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
160 Id. at 464. 
151 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995). See e.g., Ricketts v. 
Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (a defendant can waive double jeopardy defense by 
pretrial agreement); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (a defendant may 
knowingly and voluntarily waive there Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
152 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201 (a defendant may waive the protections granted to 
him under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which prohibits 
prosecutors from introducing plea negotiation statements into evidence during trial). 
153 513 U.S. 196 (1995). 
154 Id. at 210. 
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methamphetamine. 155 The prosecution agreed to speak with 
the defendant, but only if the defendant agreed to waive his 
right to have statements made during the course of the plea 
negotiations excluded from evidence, in the event that the case 
went to trial.156 To the defendant's detriment, he agreed to this 
condition. 157 As the defendant conveyed his story, the 
Government discovered inconsistencies between the 
defendant's statements and surveillance evidence they had in 
their possession and ended the meeting. 158 Subsequently, 
during the defendant's trial, the Government attempted to 
introduce the defendant's inconsistent statements into 
evidence. 159 
The defendant objected, arguing that statements made 
during the course of plea agreements that do not result in a 
guilty plea, are inadmissable at trial. 160 The trial court allowed 
the evidence and the jury returned with a guilty verdict. 161 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's waiver was 
invalid because Congress had not expressed otherwise, 
therefore, the trial judge should not have admitted the 
statements at trial.162 The United States Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling, arguing that U[r]ather than 
deeming waiver presumptively unavailable absent some sort of 
express enabling clause, we instead have adhered to the 
opposite presumption."163 The Court went on to assert that "[a] 
criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many 
of the most fundamental protections afforded by the 
Constitution." 164 Indeed, the Court argued that "[t]he 
presumption of waivability has found specific application in the 
context of evidentiary rules" where "evidentiary stipulations 
are a valuable and integral part of everyday trial practice."165 
166 [d. at 198. 
166 [d. 
167 [d. 
168 [d. at 199. 
169 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199. 
160 [d. See also FED. R. EVID. 410. 
161 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199. 
162 [d. at 200. 
163 [d. at 200·01. 
164 [d. at 201. 
166 [d. at 202·03 
23
Cahill: Brady Waivers in Plea Agreements
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
24 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
d. Unwaivable Rights 
Finally, some rights have been deemed so sacrosanct that a 
defendant may never waive or lose them as the result of a 
guilty plea or during plea negotiations.166 As the Seventh 
Circuit comically stated, "[even] if the parties stipulated to trial 
by 12 orangutans the defendant's conviction would be invalid 
notwithstanding his consent, because some minimum of 
civilized procedure is required by community feeling regardless 
of what the defendant wants or is willing to accept."167 On a 
more serious note, the United States Supreme Court has found 
that "[t]here may be some evidentiary provisions that are so 
fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that 
they may never be waived without irreparably 'discredit[ing] 
the federal courts."'168 
One such right that the Court has refused to allow a 
defendant to waive is the right to conflict-free counsel in a 
criminal proceeding.169 The defendant in Wheat v. United 
States170 attempted such a waiver and challenged his drug 
conviction on the grounds that the court refused to allow him to 
waive his right to conflict-free counsel.171 The defendant 
argued that all potential problems could have been avoided by 
a waiver of this right.172 The United States Supreme Court, 
however, held that the problem was not that simple. The Court 
held that "[f]ederal courts have an independent interest in 
ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical 
standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear 
fair to all who observe them."173 These interests, the Court 
feared, would be jeopardized if such waivers were regularly 
permitted.174 Thus, the Court held that because it was likely 
that a conflict of interest would be created by multiple 
166 Id. at 204. 
167 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (citing United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 
(7th Cir. 1985». 
168 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (quoting 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039 (1977». 
169 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988). 
170 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
171 Id. at 157. 
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representation, denial of the defendant's waIver was 
justified. 175 
While it appears that no specific formula has been used to 
determine which rights cannot be waived, as can be seen from 
the Court's decision in Wheat, when the integrity of the court 
and its processes are themselves endangered, waivers have not 
been accepted.176 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Ruiz,177 the defendant challenged the 
"fast track" plea agreement used by the U.S. Attorney's Office 
for the Southern District of California, which required the 
defendant to waive certain Brady rights on the ground that it 
violated the defendant's right to due process. 17S The court 
articulated the issues as: 1) whether the right to Brady 
information could constitutionally be waived in a plea 
agreement, and 2) whether the benefits of a plea agreement 
could be conditioned on the defendant's waiver of her right to 
Brady material. I79 
But before addressing the merits of Ruiz's appeal, the 
Government challenged the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. 
Specifically, the Government argued that Ruiz's denial of the 
"fast track" plea agreement and her subsequent unconditional 
guilty plea extinguished any antecedent constitutional 
challenges she may have had. ISO 
A. JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE . 
The Government first attacked Ruiz's appeal on the 
grounds that the Government's refusal to recommend, and the 
175 Id. at 164. 
176 See e.g. United States v. Willis, 958 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1992) (The court refused 
to allow a defendant to waive his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act 
because the waiver would obviate the societal interest of speedy justice). 
177 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001). 
178 Id. at 1161. 
179 Id. The court stated that, " [s]pecifically, Ruiz contends that: (1) the right to 
receive undisclosed Brady evidence is not subject to waiver through plea agreements, 
(2) prosecutors cannot withhold a 'fast track' recommendation simply because a 
defendant declines to waive her Brady rights, and (3) the Government here withheld 
the 'fast track' recommendation for this reason." Id. at 1163. 
ISO [d. at 1161-63. 
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sentencing judge's refusal to grant, Ruiz's request for a 
downward departure was not reviewable by the Ninth 
Circuit. 181 Generally, a defendant does not have the right to 
appeal a district court's discretionary denial of a defendant's 
request for a downward departure from the applicable 
sentencing guidelines.182 The application of this rule, however, 
is limited to cases in which the sentencing judge actually 
exercises his discretion not to depart from the sentencing 
guidelines.183 The majority, however, did not argue that the 
sentencing judge refused to exercise any discretion.184 Rather, 
the majority interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)185 as granting 
jurisdiction to appellate courts to review constitutional 
challenges to the sentence imposed.186 Thus, the majority 
asserted that the court had jurisdiction over Ruiz's 
constitutional challenge to the sentencing process itself.187 
The majority then rejected two arguments proposed by the 
Government.188 First, the Government argued that by pleading 
guilty, Ruiz forfeited her right to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Brady waiver.189 Citing United States 
v. Broce,190 the Government took the position that, Ruiz's right 
to challenge any constitutional defects that preceded the guilty 
plea was extinguished after she refused to accept the original 
"fast track" plea agreement and subsequently entered an 
181 [d. at 1161. 
182 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1161. United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 
1990). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3742 which reads in pertinent part: "(a) A defendant 
may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence 
if the sentence: (1) was imposed in violation of law (2) was imposed as a result of an 
incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines." 
183 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1162. 
184 See id. at 1162. See also United States v. Khoury, 62 F.3d 1138, 1140·42 (9th Cir. 
1995), in which the Ninth Circuit held that where the Government impermissibly 
withholds a recommendation for a downward departure, the district court may still 
exercise its own discretion to grant the downward departure. Id. at 1141 
185 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) states that a sentence is reviewable on appeal if it "was 
imposed in violation oflaw." 
186 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1162. Other circuits have also adopted this reading of 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a)(I) including the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Senn, 102 F.3d 
327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996); the Third Circuit in United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 
358 n.S (3d Cir. 1995); the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Holmes, 60 F.3d 1134, 
1137 (4th Cir. 1995); and the First Circuit in United States v. Drown, 942 F.2d 55 (1st 
Cir. 1991). 
187 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1162. 
188 [d. at 1163. 
189 [d. 
190 488 U.S. 563 (1989). 
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unconditional guilty plea.191 Simply put, the court could not 
review the constitutional defect alleged by Ruiz because it 
would have occurred prior to her entering the guilty plea. 192 
And after pleading guilty her right to raise the claim would 
have been waived or forfeited. 193 
The majority, however, held that Ruiz's appeal challenged 
the constitutionality of the Government's actions after she pled 
guilty (i.e. by refusing to recommend a downward departure at 
the sentencing hearing) and not before the guilty plea as the 
Government contended. 194 Thus, Ruiz had not waived or 
forfeited the right to raise this constitutional claim.195 
The second argument proposed by the Government rested 
on a contractual theory.196 The Government argued that it 
was under no obligation to recommend a downward departure 
because Ruiz had rejected the original "fast track" plea 
agreement present in the original offer.197 Thus, the 
Government argued that there was no agreement for the Ninth 
Circuit to enforce.19B 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on the grounds 
that Ruiz was not attempting to enforce the "fast track" plea 
agreement. 199 To the contrary, the majority announced that 
Ruiz's claim focused on the constitutionality of the 
Government's refusal to recommend the downward departure 
based on her unwillingness to waive her Brady rights in return 
for the recommendation.20o Accordingly, a majority of the 
Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review Ruiz's 
constitutional claim and proceeded to decide the case on the 
merits.201 
191 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1163. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. The dissent also argued that the unconstitutional conduct, if any, existed 
prior to the sentencing during the plea agreement when the Government asked for the 
Brady waiver. Id. at 1176 (Tallman, J. dissenting). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 





201 See id. 
27
Cahill: Brady Waivers in Plea Agreements
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
28 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 32:1 
B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO 
RECOMMEND THE "FAST TRACK" DEPARTURE 
Ruiz argued that the Government unconstitutionally 
withheld the "fast track" recommendation because she refused 
to waive her right to receive Brady evidence.202 In framing the 
issue, the court stated that the heart of Ruiz's argument was 
that the right to receive Brady evidence could not 
constitutionally be subject to waIver through plea 
agreements.203 
1. Unconstitutionality of Brady Waivers 
a. Guilty Plea Waivers Generally 
In laying the foundation for its opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
first addressed the validity of a Brady waiver by examining the 
general consequences that a guilty plea has on a defendant's 
constitutional rights.204 Generally, the court stated, a guilty 
plea has one of three effects on a defendant's constitutional 
rights.205 First, by pleading guilty, a defendant automatically 
waives several constitutional rights.206 Second, the defendant 
may have the option of expressly waiving those rights not 
automatically lost by a guilty plea as part of a plea 
agreement.207 Finally, the Ninth Circuit recognized a category 
of constitutional rights that could never be waived as the result 
of a guilty plea or as part of a plea agreement.208 Ruiz argued, 
202 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1163. 
203 Id. 
204 ld. 
205 ld. at 1163·64. 
206 ld. at 1163. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (holding 
that the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the right to 
invoke the privilege against self· incrimination were among those rights which a 
defendant automatically waived upon entering a guilty plea). See also United States v. 
Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573·74 (1989) (stating that an unconditional guilty plea generally 
results in the automatic waiver of the right to challenge any constitutional defects 
which preceded the guilty plea). 
207 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164. See also supra text accompanying note 115. 
208 ld. See United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that a plea agreement cannot bar defendants from asserting "claims involving a breach 
of the plea agreement, racial disparity in sentencing among codefendants or an illegal 
sentence impose in excess of a maximum statutory penalty."). See also United States v. 
Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1992) (in which the court held the right a unanimous 
jury verdict can never be waived). See also United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263, 1268 
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and a majority of the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the right to 
receive Brady material fell within the third category, as a right 
which could never be waived as the result or during the course 
of a plea agreement.209 
b. Invalidating the Voluntary and Intelligent Guilty Plea 
Focusing on the concepts that comprise a valid guilty plea, 
Ruiz argued that the waiver of the right to receive Brady 
information, as required by the "fast track" plea agreement, 
was unconstitutional because a defendant could not voluntarily 
and intelligently waive her right to receive Brady evidence.21o 
The Ninth Circuit, never having previously addressed 
defendants' right to receive Brady material in the context of 
plea agreements, analogized Ruiz's case to Sanchez v. United 
States.211 There the Ninth Circuit had held that defendants 
could not voluntarily and intelligently enter guilty pleas 
without Brady evidence, nor could they waive or be deemed to 
have forfeited, upon pleading guilty, the right to raise a Brady 
claim that preceded the guilty plea.212 
In Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit extended Sanchez to apply not 
only to a guilty plea entered by the defendant, but also to plea 
agreements themselves.213 The Ruiz court held that in light of 
its earlier decision in Sanchez, Brady rights are not 
automatically waived by the entry of a guilty plea. 214 
Accordingly, the court had to resolve whether a defendant's 
right to receive Brady evidence could either be expressly 
(9th Cir. 1997) (which provides for an unwaivable right to a speedy trial). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 1163. See also supra note 8 for the "Fast Track" plea agreement 
Brady waiver in Ruiz. 
211 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995); Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164. The Ruiz court pointed out 
that no court had ever addressed the issue as to whether Brady rights could be waived 
in a plea agreement. Id. In Sanchez, the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy and 
intent to distribute cocaine. Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1450. Sanchez argued that his guilty 
plea should be revoked because the Government had committed a Brady violation by 
failing to disclose that two "friends· who had visited Sanchez in jail and counseled him 
to plead guilty were also Government informants. Id. at 1451. Apparently the 
informants (who Sanchez believed to be friends) told Sanchez that if he pled guilty they 
would be able to secure his release through contacts they had in Washington D.C. and 
that his wife would not be indicted. Id. 
212 See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453. See also supra text accompanying note 139 for a 
thorough discussion of the forfeiture issue in Sanchez. 
213 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164. 
214 Id. 
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waived by the defendant in a plea agreement or whether the 
right to receive Brady evidence was a right that could not be 
waived at all.215 
Focusing on the voluntary and intelligent requirements of 
a valid guilty plea, the court stated that "plea agreements, like 
guilty pleas, must be entered into voluntarily and intelligently 
to satisfy due process requirements."216 The pre-plea disclosure 
of Brady evidence, the court continued, plays an important role 
in the defendant's assessment of the prosecution's case and 
decision whether to plead guilty.217 In addition, such disclosure 
ensures that the prosecution does not deliberately suppress 
exculpatory information to achieve a conviction.218 Thus, the 
court concluded that "plea agreements, and any waiver of 
Brady rights contained therein, 'cannot be deemed intelligent 
and voluntary if entered without knowledge of material 
information withheld by the prosecution.'" The court reasoned 
that, if the need for Brady material is crucial during a guilty 
plea in order to both ensure the defendant is making the proper 
decision and the prosecutor is not suppressing information as 
in Sanchez, then the need for Brady material is as equally 
important during a plea agreement.219 
To overcome the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Sanchez, the 
Government attempted to distinguish defendants' waiver of 
rights during the entry of plea agreements with defendants' 
215 Id. 
216 Id. (citing United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996». 
217 Ruiz 241 F.3d at 1164. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. The Ninth Circuit, in reaching its conclusion in Ruiz, analogized its 
reasoning with the court's analysis in DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 
2000). In DeRoo, the plea agreement included a waiver of ineffective assistance of 
council claims. Id. at 923-24. The challenge to the waiver was that it prevented the 
defendant from entering a plea agreement voluntarily and· intelligently. Id. The 
Eighth Circuit held that a "decision to enter into a plea agreement cannot be knowing 
and voluntary when the plea agreement itself is the result of advice outside the range 
of competence .... " Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded that ·'fj]ustice dictates that 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of [a plea] 
agreement cannot be barred by the agreement - the very product of the alleged 
ineffectiveness.'" Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 
1999». With this holding the Eighth Circuit effectively barred waivers of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims associated with the negotiation of plea agreements. See 
DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 923-24. For similar propositions, the Ruiz court also pointed to: 
United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Henderson, 72 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 1995); and United States v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175 (4th 
Cir. 1993). 
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waiver of rights during the entry of guilty pleas.22o The 
Government asserted that the situations were distinct because 
in a plea agreement a defendant is aware of the rights being 
waived, while in the entry of a guilty plea a defendant would 
not be aware.221 As such, the Government contended that 
Ruiz's waiver of her right to impeachment evidence during the 
course of her plea agreement did not violate the voluntary and 
intelligent requirement.222 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because in 
Sanchez it was not the Government's failure to disclose the 
existence of the right to receive Brady material that rendered 
the guilty plea involuntary and unintelligent.223 Rather, it was 
the Government's failure to produce the actual Brady evidence 
that gave validity to the defendant's claim.224 Similarly, in 
Ruiz's case, the court held that "a defendant's abstract 
awareness of her rights under Brady is a pale substitute for the 
receipt of concrete Brady material."225 The court reasoned, that 
with the actual Brady material, the defendant would be in a 
much better position to make a voluntary and intelligent choice 
about entering a guilty plea.226 Without such information, a 
guilty plea could not be voluntary and intelligent and therefore 
valid.227 In this way, the court concluded that a defendant's 
right to receive Brady evidence could not be constitutionally 
waived through a plea agreement.228 
c. Protecting a Defendant's Right to Impeachment Evidence 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the Government's 
argument that, while the waiver of all Brady rights may not be 
constitutional, the waiver at issue in the "fast track" agreement 
was not unconstitutional because it required that Ruiz waive 
only some Brady rights, specifically her right to receive 
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impeachment evidence of Government witnesses.229 Because 
the case would never proceed to trial, as a result of Ruiz guilty 
plea, the Government argued that impeachment evidence was 
irrelevant at the pretrial plea bargain stage.230 
On the contrary, the court could find nothing to suggest 
that Sanchez s holding only required prosecutors to produce 
exculpatory evidence and not impeachment evidence before the 
entry of a guilty plea.231 In fact, the court indicated that the 
opposite was true, noting that "[t]he Brady rule encompasses 
impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence."232 The 
court stated the United States Supreme Court "declined to 
recognize any meaningful difference between these two types of 
Brady evidence."233 Rather, the court found that a reasonable 
interpretation of Sanchez was much broader, requiring 
prosecutors to disclose both impeachment and exculpatory 
evidence before the defendant entered a guilty plea.234 
The court reiterated that according to the Brady rule, the 
Government is required to disclose evidence that is "favorable 
to the defendant if it is 'material."'235 In the context of Ruiz's 
case, the Ninth Circuit found that "evidence is 'material' if 
'there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to 
disclose the Brady material, the defendant would have refused 
to plead and would have gone to trial."'236 Thus, the court held 
that impeachment evidence is 'material' because the disclosure 
of such evidence could "create a reasonable probability the 
defendant would reject the plea agreement."237 
The court also held that prosecutors must disclose Brady 
material at a time when the information will be of value to the 
accused.238 In the context of plea agreements, this would be 
before a defendant accepted the plea agreement.239 
229 [d. at 1165-66. See also supra note 8 for the "Fast Track" plea agreement 
Brady waiver in Ruiz. 
230 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166. 
231 [d. 
232 [d. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676). 
233 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-77). 
234 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166. 
235 [d. (citing Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453). 
236 [d. (quoting Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454). 
237 [d. 
238 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166 (citing United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th 
Cir. 1988». 
239 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166-67. The court went on to state that, " [t]his does not mean, 
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Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor's duty 
to disclose impeachment evidence could not be separated from 
its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence and such disclosure 
was required before the accused entered into a plea 
agreement.240 
2. Conditioning the ''Fast Track IJ Plea Agreement on an 
Unconstitutional Brady Waiver 
Finally, Ruiz contended that the Government acted with' 
an unconstitutional motive when it opposed her request for the 
downward departure based simply on the fact that she would 
not accept what she believed to be an unconstitutional Brady 
waiver.241 The Government, on the other hand, asserted that it 
was not improper to condition Ruiz's plea agreement on the 
waiver of her Brady rights because she was never obligated to 
accept the agreement.242 Before addressing Ruiz's argument, 
the court discussed whether it would be permissible for the 
Government to refuse to recommend a downward departure 
present in a plea agreement that the defendant rejected 
because it contained an unconstitutional waiver of that 
defendant's rights.243 
In discussing this issue, the court recognized that is not 
unconstitutional for prosecutors to encourage defendants to 
forego constitutionally protected rights through incentives.244 
The court pointed out, however, that this rule "is premised on 
the assumption that the targeted rights may be validly 
waived."245 Contrary to the rule, the court had found that the 
right to receive undisclosed Brady material could not be 
constitutionally waived without violating the Due Process 
requirement that a defendant's plea be voluntary and 
intelligent.246 Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
as the Government contends, that impeachment evidence is only valuable if there is 
going to be a trial. It simply means that, if there is going to be a trial, impeachment 
evidence, like exculpatory evidence, must be disclosed while it is still valuable." [d. 




244 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1167 (quoting United States v. Villasenor-Cesar, 114 F.3d 970, 
975 (9th Cir. 1997». 
245 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1167. 
246 [d. at 1167-68. 
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Government could not constitutionally withhold a downward 
departure recommendation based on a defendant's refusal to 
accept a Brady waiver.247 
As to Ruiz's argument that the Government acted with an 
unconstitutional motive, the court stated that it would indeed 
have been impermissible for the Government to oppose the 
downward departure simply because Ruiz refused to waive her 
Brady rights.248 To prove such a motive existed, Ruiz had to 
make a "substantial threshold showing" by producing evidence 
that the Government acted in such a manner.249 In finding 
that Ruiz had satisfied her burden, the court pointed to the fact 
that Ruiz had consistently represented that she refused to 
accept the "fast track" plea agreement because she would have 
had to waive her Brady rights.250 This, coupled with the fact 
that the Government refused to recommend the downward 
departure because no plea agreement obligated it to do so, 
compelled the court to order an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the Government impermissibly withheld 
the departure because Ruiz refused to accept the 
unconstitutional Brady waiver.251 
C. JUDGE TALLMAN'S DISSENTING OPINION 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tallman set forth a 
lengthy discussion agreeing with the Government's contention 
that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to consider the issues 
in this case.252 Upon evaluating the Brady issue, Judge 
Tallman stated that he feared the negative policy implications 
the majority's holding would have on the processing of criminal 
cases in an overloaded system.253 Judge Tallman argued that 
the obligatory disclosure of impeachment evidence to an 
accused as early as the plea bargaining stage would be both 
useless to the defendant so early on and would damage the 
247 [d. at 1168. 
248 See [d. at 1167 (citing Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185·86 (1992) and 
United States v. Treleaven, 35 F.3d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1994». 
249 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1168. 
250 [d. 
251 [d. at 1168·69. The United States Supreme Court has since granted certiorari in 
Ruiz. See United States v. Ruiz, 122 S.Ct. 803 (2002). 
252 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1172. 
253 [d. at 11 76. 
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prosecution's case in the future. 254 In the event of a trial, 
Judge Tallman argued that early disclosure could be 
problematic, "for example, if the government were required to 
publicly release information on the identity of an informant 
that it would like to keep confidential as long as possible."255 
Ultimately, Judge Tallman objected to the rule established 
by the majority's opinion because it would likely dissolve the 
"fast track" program that had been operating so successfully.256 
Judge Tallman argued that if mandatory disclosure was 
required in all cases, even those that did not proceed to trial, 
an already over-worked system would become even more 
congested as prosecutors scrambled to disclose evidence that 
would only be useful at trial not during the plea agreement 
process.257 
D. JunGE TASHIMA'S CONOURRING OPINION 
Judge Tashima wrote a concurring opinion primarily to 
respond to Judge Tallman's argument that jurisdiction was 
improper.258 Judge Tashima, also addressed Judge Tallman's 
concern that the majority's ruling would have negative policy 
implications.259 Judge Tashima stated that while the Southern 
District of California had a heavy caseload, the court's ruling 
declaring impeachment waivers unconstitutional would not 
undermine the effectiveness of the "fast track" program.260 He 
argued that in simple cases, such as Ruiz's, the Government 
would be faced with very few, if any, Government witnesses, 
and thus would have to disclose very little impeachment 
evidence.261 Thus, Judge Tashima argued that Judge Tallman 
had no reason to be concerned that the Government's Brady 
obligations would become overwhelming.262 Even assuming the 
court's ruling did create a "caseload crisis," Judge Tashima 




257 Id. at 1176·77. 
258 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1169·70. 
259 Id. at 1170·71. 
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Congress to authorize more judgeships, not for the court to 
"shortcut the Constitution."263 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. PRESERVING THE TRUTH-SEEKING FUNCTION: THE NEED 
FOR PRE-TRIAL BRADY DISCLOSURES 
Possibly the most important aspect of the Ninth Circuit's 
holding in Ruiz, is that it seeks to preserve the truth-seeking 
function of the courts and the criminal justice system in 
general. Since its decision in Brady v. Maryland, the United 
States Supreme Court has consistently held that the driving 
force behind requiring the prosecution to disclose exculpatory 
and impeachment evidence during plea negotiations is to 
ensure that "justice is done its citizens in the courts."264 In the 
same spirit, the Court has historically recognized that it is the 
role of the courts and prosecutors to ascertain the truth when a 
person is accused of a crime, not simply to obtain a 
conviction.265 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's holding seems to conflict 
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Mezzanatto. 266 In Mezzanatto, the Court expressed the view 
that criminal defendants are presumptively free to waive most 
of their fundamental rights, especially those granting them 
protection under the rules of evidence.267 In this way the 
Brady discovery rule is similar to the rules of evidence because 
of its focus on trial procedure. Thus, it could be argued under 
Mezzanatto that the Brady rule IS a right which is 
263 Id. at 1170. 
264 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. See also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11 ("For though the 
attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he 
must always be faithful to his client's overriding interest that 'justice shall be done'"); 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) ("[Brady] disclosures will serve to justify 
trust in the prosecutor as 'the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... 
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.'" 
(citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935». 
265 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (admitting plea statements for impeachment 
purposes because it enhances the truth-seeking function of trials); Brown v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958) (it is the function of the courts of justice to ascertain 
the truth); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440 (discussing the role of courts and prosecutors in 
ensuring that the truth is found when a person is accused of a crime). 
266 See also supra text accompanying note 153. 
267 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 200-03. See also supra text accompanying note 153. 
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presumptively waiveable. In Mezzanatto, however, it was 
relatively simple for the Court to conclude that defendants can 
constitutionally waive their right to have plea statements 
excluded during trial, especially since such a waiver would 
result in the production of more information for a jury to use 
during deliberation.26B 
Contrary to the waiver at issue in Mezzanatto, the purpose 
of the "fast track" waiver in Ruiz was not to produce more 
information thereby leading. to a more accurate or informed 
plea by the defendant.269 Rather, the purpose of the waiver in 
Ruiz was to exclude as much information as constitutionally 
permissible.270 It was not designed to ensure that the truth 
was found or that justice was achieved. Instead, as Judge 
Tallman's dissent points out, the waiver was included in plea 
agreements to speed cases through the court's docket, thereby 
unclogging an already overburdened judicial system.271 
While the idea of creating an efficient criminal justice 
system is appealing, the manner in which this goal is achieved 
through the "fast track" agreement is problematic.272 
Requiring Brady waivers in plea agreements can ultimately 
only diminish the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice 
system by relieving prosecutors of their duty to disclose the 
most valuable information to an accused at the most valuable 
point in time. Instead of pushing uninformed criminal 
defendants through a congested system because it is too costly 
to provide them with impeachment evidence, the Ninth Circuit 
properly held in Ruiz that it is unconstitutional to deprive 
defendants of Brady information. This is so whether or not 
they are willing to waive their right to receive this information. 
To preserve the truth-seeking nature of our criminal justice 
268 [d. at 204. See also supra text accompanying note 153. 
269 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1165·66. 
270 See id. The Government, in order to win over a majority of the Ninth Circuit, 
argued that they weren't trying to deprive Ruiz of all her Brady rights, just some of 
them. [d. 
271 [d. at 1176·77 (Tallman, J. dissenting). Judge Tallman noted that "[t]hrough the 
fast track program the [Southern] District [of California] has been able to dramatically 
expedite the processing of its heavy workload." [d. 
272 See [d. at 1170·71 (Tashima, J. concurring). Judge Tashima states that 
"[i]ncreased prosecutorial efficiency is a commendable goal, but it surely should not be 
advanced at the cost of requiring the accused to give up an unwaivable constitutional 
right. The appropriate solution ... is for Congress to authorize more judgeships, not to 
shortcut the Constitution." Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1170·71 (Tashima, J. concurring). 
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system as a whole, and not just at trials, it is important that 
Brady evidence be strictly guarded. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ruiz has placed the 
right to receive Brady evidence among those "rare 
constitutional rights that cannot be waived ... ".273 In doing so, 
the court has protected an accused's right to receive 
exculpatory and impeachment evidence that the Government 
has in its possession at a time when the disclosure of such 
evidence would be of "value" - here, before the acceptance of a 
plea agreement.274 
As several courts have noted, a defendant's decision 
whether to plead guilty rests heavily on his assessment of the 
prosecution's case.275 Mter the Ninth Circuit's holding in Ruiz, 
those accused of a crime are now in a much better position to 
evaluate the weight of material evidence in their favor and 
then make a decision as to how they will proceed.276 Without 
the disclosure of Brady information at plea bargaining stage of 
criminal proceedings, the inducement of guilty pleas from those 
who have possibly been falsely or mistakenly accused could 
become a common reality.277 Further, if a guilty plea did result 
in waiver or forfeiture of the right to raise a Brady claim, such 
a rule would apply across the board. As one commentator 
noted, regardless of whether a prosecutor wrongfully 
suppresses Brady evidence to induce a guilty plea, fails to 
disclose evidence it should have reasonably been aware of 
before the guilty plea was entered, or did not discover the 
evidence until after the guilty plea was entered, the result is 
the same - the defendant would be barred from raising a Brady 
claim.278 In short, a defendant who pled guilty would be 
273 [d. at 1172. 
274 [d. at 1166-67. 
275 See e.g., Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164; Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453; Miller, 848 F.2d at 
1320; Brady, 397 U.S. at 756. 
276 It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit's position in Matthew regarding this idea 
was over broad. The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Ruiz does nothing to change the rule 
that prosecutors are only required to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence 
and not incriminating evidence. Thus, under the Ruiz line of reasoning, prosecutors 
are not required to turn over their entire case file to an accused, but only material 
evidence regarding the accused's innocence. 
277 See, Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 968-84 (1989). For an argument that such fears are unwarranted, 
see, John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 499-501 (2001). 
278 Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist S Guide 
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helpless to challenge his plea if exculpatory evidence was later 
discovered, regardless of whether the evidence was wrongfully 
suppressed or innocently overlooked by the prosecution. 
Not all courts agree with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in 
Ruiz. There is a a sharp divide between those circuits who 
would follow the Ninth Circuits opinion and those who would 
oppose it.279 The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Matthew u. Johnson 
is an example.280 Up to now, however, the debate has focused 
less on the truth-seeking aspect of pre-trial Brady disclosures 
and more on the technical applicability of Brady in the pre-trial 
context.281 In focusing on Brady's application to the pre-trial 
stages of the criminal process, the value of Ruiz is best 
illustrated when compared with the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
Matthew. 
B. DEFENDING RUIZ AGAINST MAITHEW 
As mentioned, the Ruiz court found the reasoning 
underlying the Brady rule to be applicable at the plea 
bargaining stage of criminal proceedings. In contrast, the Fifth 
Circuit in Matthew argued that the Brady rule was meant only 
to apply to trials, thus implying that an accused is not entitled 
to be treated fairly during any other stage of the criminal 
process.282 The Matthew court went so far as to state that 
Bradyevidence is not necessary to protect the due process 
rights of those who plead guilty.283 
The Fifth Circuit's position is in dirct conflict with the 
Court's reasoning in Brady that U[s]ociety wins not only when 
the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our 
to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L.REV. 2011, 2060 (2000). 
279 See e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1988) (guilty plea not 
knowing and intelligent if entered without knowledge of exculpatory Brady material); 
United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Campbell v. 
Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 
416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988) (same). But cf Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655, 657 (8th 
Cir. 1989) (in pleading guilty defendant waives all challenges to the prosecution); 
Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361, 364-69 (5th Cir. 2000) (in the absence of a trial 
no Brady violation can occur and plea not involuntary or unintelligent without Brady 
evidence). For this reason it is likely that the United States Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari to Ruiz. See United States v. Ruiz, 122 S.Ct 803 (2002). 
280 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000). 
281 See also supra note 78. 
282 See also supra note 146. 
283 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 362 n.13. 
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system of the administration of justice suffers when any 
accused is treated unfairly."284 It is abundantly clear from this 
statement that the Court was not limiting an accused's right to 
be treated fairly to trials alone, as the Fifth Circuit would 
suggest. Rather, the Court's statement in Brady indicates that 
any time an accused is treated unfairly, justice suffers. 
Withholding exculpatory information from an accused as he 
struggles to decide whether to take an attractive deal and 
spend time in prison, or go to trial and take his chance based 
on the limited evidence he is aware of, is not justice. Such a 
rule would more likely lead to a number of wrongful 
convictions. As the United States Supreme Court has acutely 
pointed out, "concern about the injustice that results from the 
conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of 
our criminal justice system. That concern is reflected, for 
example, in the 'fundamental value determination of our 
society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to 
let a guilty man go free."'285 In Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit properly 
recognized and applied these principles.286 
Based on the Matthew court's holding, a prosecutor could 
constitutionally and purposefully withhold exculpatory 
information fully knowing that an individual who was likely 
innocent was prepared to plead guilty. This is precisely what 
the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez, as echoed in Ruiz, feared would 
result if defendants were barred from raising post-plea Brady 
claims.287 As the court in Ruiz pointed out, reason demands 
that a prosecutor's duty to disclose Brady evidence becomes 
effective before an accused decides to plead guilty. It makes 
little sense to wait until after the accused has pled guilty to 
284 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
285 Schlup u. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also T. Starkie, EVIDENCE 756 (1824) ("The maxim 
of the law is ... that it is better that ninety-nine ... offenders should escape, than that 
one innocent man should be condemned."). See generally Newman, Beyond 
"Reasonable Doubt," 68 N. Y. U. L. REV. 979980-81 (1993». 
286 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164. As the court noted, "if a defendant may not raise a Brady 
claim after a guilty plea, prosecutors may be tempted to deliberately withhold 
exculpatory information as part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas. . .. Moreover, the 
same prosecutorial incentive to withhold Brady information that would arise if guilty 
pleas extinguished Brady rights would arise if plea agreements could extinguish those 
rights." [d. 
287 Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453 ("if a defendant may not raise a Brady claim after a 
guilty plea, prosecutors may be tempted to deliberately withhold exculpatory 
information as part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas.") 
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then provide him with exculpatory evidence. No valid reason 
exists to allow a prosecutor to withhold evidence, once it is 
obtained, which indicates that a defendant who is about to 
plead guilty is in fact innocent. Many courts and 
commentators have argued extensively about the semantics of 
the Brady rule itself, specifically whether the materiality 
standard can be broadened to cover the plea bargaining 
stage.288 However, the reality that prosecutors could take this 
type of action under the approach suggested in Matthew should 
lay the debate to rest. 
Of course, one can argue that a defendant could force 
prosecutors to make Brady disclosures simply by electing to go 
to trial and professing their innocence. Such an approach 
ignores the enormous pressure that current sentencing laws 
place on even innocent defendants to accept a plea bargain 
when the evidence known to the defendant makes prevailing at 
trial uncertain.289 There appears to be something inherently 
wrong with the notion that we should allow prosecutors to sit 
on exculpatory evidence when possibly innocent defendant's 
need this information to make a fully informed decision about 
whether to plead or not. Such a rule seems to wrongly place 
the initial burden of proving innocence on the defendant, the 
party least capable of doing SO.290 
Any fears that such a rule will lead to defendants 
systematically asserting that they would have pled differently 
in light of undisclosed Brady evidence in order to have guilty 
pleas routinely overturned can be quelled by the objective 
standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in Ruiz.291 Under this 
standard, for a defendant to have a guilty plea reversed based 
on an alleged Brady violation, the court would have to be 
satisfied that persuasiveness of the evidence would have 
provided a plausible enough defense that the defendant would 
288 See also supra text note 78. 
289 Interview with Robert K. Calhoun, Professor, Golden Gate University School of 
Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (February 5, 2002). 
290 See Lisa M. Kurcias, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 
FORDHAM L.REV. 1205, 1209 (2000) ("prosecutors have the benefit of a police force that 
investigates their cases and gathers evidence for them. This broad access puts 
defendants at a great disadvantage in preparing their cases. In the adversary system 
in which the prosecutor operates, the availability of these powers leads to great 
inequity between the prosecution and the defense in a criminal trial.") 
291 Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454. 
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have chosen to go to trial rather than plead guilty.292 In cases 
in which a court found that such objective evidence did exist 
and was withheld by the prosecution during the entry of a 
guilty plea, the court's hands should not be tied by virtue of the 
fact that the defendant pled guilty. At the very least, an 
accused should be granted a new hearing in which the court 
could decide whether or not to accept the guilty plea in light of 
the new evidence. 
Even though applying the Brady rule to post-plea 
situations is a potentially difficult task for courts,293 it 
nonetheless should be done. The risks of not doing so is too 
great. If a defendant pleads guilty based on a set of facts that 
are later refuted by evidence that the Government knowingly 
and purposefully suppressed, the court should not then be 
forced to deny the defendant the opportunity to plead anew or 
withdraw his plea and proceed to trial because the defendant 
forfeited his right to make a Brady claim by not choosing to go 
to trial. Rather, the court should be able to find that its 
acceptance of the guilty plea violated due process and the 
prosecutor's conduct violated the Brady rule. This is what the 
Ninth Circuit decided in Ruiz. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Ruiz properly placed Brady 
rights among those constitutional rights so sacred that they 
can never be lost, and for good reason. Not only do Brady 
waivers violate the principle that guilty pleas must be knowing 
for them to be valid, it inhibits the courts and its custodians 
from finding the truth. A rule that allows prosecutors to 
withhold exculpatory information from an accused during a 
plea bargain violates the most fundamental concept of fairness. 
As such, Brady waivers impinge on the most deeply rooted 
principles underlying the criminal justice system. It is likely 
that the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to 
Ruiz due to the dramatic inconsistency among the circuit 
courts in applying Brady.294 Given the principles upon which 
292 Id. 
293 See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and 
Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 472·87 (2001). 
294 See United States v. Ruiz, 122 S.Ct. 803 (2002). 
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Ruiz was decided, the Supreme Court should affIrm the Ninth 
Circuit's decision. 
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